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by
FRANK HONIGSBAUM
EyFIcI!rr management generally demands unified administration and nowhere is this
more important than in the field ofpublic health where failures in co-ordination can
prove fatal. Yet when we come to examine the National Health Service, we find it,
like Caesar's Gaul, riven into three parts-producing incalculable damage to the
maternity and tuberculosis services. Where the hospitals were concerned, there was
some cause for separation in 1948. The voluntary hospitals put up such a strong case
for it that even municipal hospitals were removed from local authority purview. But
when we come to the other two branches ofthe Service, separation makes less sense.
On the face of it, there seems to be no reason why local authority services (clinics,
district nurses, midwives, health visitors, home helps) should be set apart from the
general practitioner services which rely greatly upon them. Both deal with the same
patients in the same community. Divisions created by the insurance principle under
the National Health Insurance Act no longer exist-impoverished dependants (not
covered by the panel before 1948) no longer have to rely on local authorities and the
Poor Law for medical relief. Thanks to Exchequer finance, they are as free to use the
general practitioner (and hospital) services as those whoareemployed. Nordogeneral
practitioners any longer resent clinic encroachment the way they did when private
practice played a larger part in their lives. Now that the capitation fee under the
Health Service fully protects them, many are only too glad to let local authorities
(and hospitals) relieve them of work.
Nor do geographical barriers stand in the way. Local authorities not only cover
much the same ground as executive councils (the bodies which administer the general
practitioner service) but appoint members to them. The similarity between the two
was noted as farback as 1926bythe Royal Commission onNational Health Insurance
at a time when executive councils were called insurance committees (with somewhat
different composition). It saw no reason for their continued separation.' Yet, despite
its clear call for unification, nothing was done about it either then or in 1948 when
the divisions created by the insurance principle disappeared. This paper attempts to
explain why.
INSURANCE COMMITrEES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
We begin by placing insurance committees in historical perspective. By 1930, they
were the main survivor ofthe adhoc principle which characterized British government
in the nineteenth century.2 School boards were eliminated (in 1902) even before in-
surance committees were created (in 1911) and the boards ofguardians went in 1929.
Hadallthreeexistedin 1888, onewouldhavethoughtthatinsurance committeeswould
be the first to go. Unlike the other two, they never had rate-making power and their
areas were almost exactly contiguous with those of local authorities. Furthermore,
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except for the handling of complaints, their duties were unimportant, being largely
clerical in nature. Theynever livedupto the expectations ofthosewhoconceived them.
Why, then, were they created at all? In the face ofthe unification movement which
preceded them, it seems hard to understand. This movement really began in 1834 with
the epoch-making Poor Law reform since the boards of guardians created then were
all-purpose authorities limited only in coverage of population. No other body in
British history, in fact, offered such a wide array of social services even ifthe price in
terms ofhuman dignity was high. After 1834, the unification movement was set back
by the absence of a single authority outside the municipal boroughs. County councils
were not created until 1888. This was the main reason why the Royal Sanitary Com-
mission of 1869 had to restrict itself to central administration. It considered local
unification desirable but, in the absence ofcounty councils, it could only produce the
Local Government Board.3
But from 1888 on (to 1936), the tide toward unification surged forward strongly
again. School boardswentin 1902 and, though the 1907 school medical service created
a further split in public health administration, it was expected to be temporary. In
1909,just two years before insurance committees were created, the Royal Commission
on the Poor Laws issued a clear call for unification in public health, on the central as
well as the local level. Lloyd George, however, refused to follow that advice mainly
because, with friendly societies administering his National Health Insurance scheme,
it was impossible for him to do so. This was the first time in British history that volun-
tary bodies were used on a large scale to provide State services* and their number
grew even larger after industrial insurance offices, trade unions and others were added.
All, after passing simple tests, could become approved societies and, to supervise
them, Lloyd George had to create a new ad hoc body on which they could enjoy
representation. Hence arose the National Health Insurance Commissions-one for
each 'country' in the British Isles (England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland).**
The same considerations applied on the local level where medical benefit was con-
cerned-only more so. It was impossible to start a new service afresh since the friendly
societies had provided one for nearly a century. Yet, their administration of club
practice had become a national disgrace which the doctors had failed to rectify
after sixteen years ofstruggle. Most ofthe other approved societies had no experience
of the subject at all, never having offered it on a voluntary basis. Lloyd George had
to create a body onwhich all thesevariousinterests couldbe represented. He therefore
set up insurance committees with 60 per cent ofthe seats going to approved societies
and only about 10 per cent to the doctors (the rest being held by local authority and
Commission appointees). It was no easy task for Lloyd George to carry the parties
even this far. The friendly societies resisted strongly any attempt to take medical
benefit from them and Lloyd George had to turn to the doctors for aid.t But it was
* Voluntary societies, however, were used on asmaller scale both by the Local Government Board
and the Board of Education to provide maternity and child welfare services. Similar provision was
made in thecase ofmental health andwelfare oftheblindservices. MadelineRooff,VoluntarySocieties
andSocialPolicy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957.
** There was also a Joint Committee to lay down policies common to all four.
t For a brilliant analysis of the tortuous negotiations surrounding the Bill, see Bentley Gilbert,
The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain, London, Michael Joseph, 1966, pp. 289-447.
Much more, however, needs to be said on the subject.
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impossible to take the next step. Lloyd George hoped to transfer control again before
the Bill became law-this time to local authorities. But neither the friendly societies
nor the authorities would allow it (the latter largely because it would involve them
in extra costs and work).' A new ad hoc body thus became enshrined in the Act.
Once this happened, central control was inevitable. Local bargaining (between
societies and doctors as in club practice) had been envisaged in the original Bill but
it was impossible to apply when the employees themselves (i.e. the doctors) secured
direct representation on insurance committees. (In addition, they won statutory
local medical committees oftheir own which, over the years, usurped more and more
duties from insurance committees). This drained insurance committees ofpower and
made them more like clerical arms of a central department (as in the case of labour
exchanges) than independent bodies in their own right. They managed, however,
to survive even the demise of the National Health Insurance Commissions (and the
creation of the Ministry of Health) in 1919. Local unification was intended then-it
was, in fact, closer in 1919 than any time before or since-but the project was post-
poned after the Poor Law reform failed to carry. Despite unity at the centre, local
authorities, insurance committees and boards of guardians went their separate ways.
APPROVED SOCIETIES RESIST UNIFICATION
This was the situation when the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance
issued an insistent call for the absorption ofinsurance committees by local authorities
in March 1926. The merits ofthe proposal had long been appreciated but the doctors
had an additional reason for desiring it. Having just completed thirteen years of
struggle over medical benefit, they were anxious to undermine approved society
influence. What better way than to transfer control to local authorities? Surprisingly,
not only the unions but the friendly societies themselves endorsed the proposal in
the hopes of securing an extended medical service. Only the industrial insurance
offices were opposed since they had vested interests to protect. Ifmedical benefit were
transferred, the cash maternity benefit-which had proved so useful in the purchase
of industrial insurance policies-might go too.* Local authorities would then be
well placed to expand maternity provision (beyond the clinics already established)
inside a unified medical service, reducing the need for cash supplements.
It was not long, however, before the friendly societies changed their mind on the
subject. The initial cause was the Economy Act which, by 'robbing' National Health
Insurance funds to help pay for the Contributory Pensions Act, drained all hope of
extending the medical service. The only way left was by pooling surpluses** but the
societies, by then, were in no mood to share their wealth with less fortunate groups
(like the unions) in the approved society world.
* Maternity benefit was raised only once during the whole National Health Insurance period-
1920, from 30s. to 40s. (or double those amounts ifthe mother was insured in her own right).
** Each societyhad its ownfund out ofwhichit paidthe 'normal' orstatutorybenefits. Ifanything
were left over after each valuation (once every five years), then it could provide additional benefits
as well. Some societies realized large surpluses while others incurred substantial deficits, producing
wide disparities in additional benefits. This led to a demand for equal benefits by sharing the wealth.
The Ministry, acting on a recommendation ofthe Royal Commission, tried to persuade the societies
to pool one-halfoftheir surpluses so that all could at least provide specialist and laboratory services
as an addition to medical benefit. The friendly societies refused to accept it not only because they
were wealthy but because they feared that, once pooling began, it would lead to the end of the
approved society system.
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What really galvanized their attitude, however, was the realization of what the
doctors were after. The threat implicit in 'unification' did not become clear until the
British Medical Association revealed the full import of its proposals before the
Royal Commission on Local Government in 1926. Then, in a statement drafted solely
by Dr. (later Sir Henry) Brackenbury,* the British Medical Association reiterated
its call for the abolition ofinsurance committees but carefully excluded any mention
of approved society representation on the new local authority bodies which would
administer the service. Each authority would be compelled to form statutory health
committees and, though the doctors were willing to accept minority representation,
they wanted all the remaining members to be appointed by the local authority, room
being left for others (who would be co-opted) only on the sub-committees created to
deal with special subjects like National Health Insurance. Brackenbury, however,
preserved a place for local medical committees which would not only appoint all
medical representatives as before but would enjoy the right to present their views
directly to local authorities, theMinistry and thepublic.A Furthermore, theiroperating
expenses would no longer be defrayed by the profession but would be borne by local
authorities, thereby prompting the National Insurance Gazette (the voice mainly of
the offices in the approved society world) to cry: 'The doctors want a local trade
union, to be paid for by the public!'
The memorandum created an uproar among the approved societies, even those
run by the unions. One official thought 'they could not shut their eyes to the fact
that the British Medical Association was becoming obnoxious'.7 Another saw in the
statement an attempt by the doctors 'to get the whole control ofthe medical service
in their hands', pleading with his colleagues not to 'damn National Health Insurance'
by giving local authorities, who 'already had more work than they could carry out',
a chance to abdicate responsibility.8 Still another feared the fate of the mixed lay-
medical complaint-hearing bodies (medical service sub-committees) if administration
were transferred to local authorities, singling out the British Medical Association's
demand (to the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance) for a purely
professional tribunal 'as about the most audacious proposal ever made'.9
It took Henry Lesser** of the employer-sponsored approved society group,
however, to unravel the full implications ofthe statement:
... while insurance committees were to go, local medical committees under another name were
to remain-a rather thin disguise ... the local medical conmnittee was to be absolutely indepen-
dent ofthe local authority who, however, were to be responsible for its administrative expenses.
* Brackenbury was a general practitioner from Hornsey who, by 1926, had accumulated more
than 27 years' experience in local government. Together with Dr. Alfred Cox, Medical Secretary,
he dominated British Medical Association policy between the wars. He died in 1942. Alfred Cox,
Among The Doctors, London, Christopher Johnson, 1950, pp. 105-6.
** Lesser, who qualified as a barrister in 1913-4, took no part in the negotiations on the Bill but
became prominent in National Health Insurance shortly thereafter, acting on behalf of the em-
ployees' approved society organized by the South Metropolitan Gas Co. He spoke for the anti-union
employers in the approved society world, leading the various attempts made by them to undermine
union inuece in the social insurance field, and to forestall the 'nationalization' ofNational Health
Insurance. He was also one ofthe leaders ofthe London Insurance Committee throughout the entire
National Health Insurance period. When the approved society system passed away in 1948, he
became a consultant on occupational pensions, acting also as adviser on that subject for the Con-
servative Party in the 1950s. He died in January 1967.
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He was not sure whether they ought to take this document seriously. From a constitutional
point of view, it was worthy not of the twentieth century, but of the Middle Ages. According
to the British Medical Association, insured persons and employers were to pay for the costs of
panel treatment, but were to have no controlling voice in its administration while the doctors
were to be free to appoint whom they pleased. The approved societies were rather contemp-
tuously dismissedfromthegamealtogether. Atpresent thesocieties weretheonlybodiesstanding
between the insured persons and the panel doctors. They had a right to be heard in complaints
before medical service sub-committees and through their representatives on the local insurance
committees, were enabled to keep a watchful eye on the administration of medical benefit
generally. The doctors apparently wanted to put an end to this. Hence their demand for the
abolition ofthe local insurance committees.10
There had been frequent clashes in the past between approved societies and in-
surance committees (despite their 60 percentsociety majority) over the administration
of additional treatment benefits.* But the threat to abolish insurance committees
repaired the breach, for it forced the societies to realize how muchtheirownexistence
was intertwined with that ofinsurance committees." The creation ofa unified health
service, part ofwhich would be financed on a tax or rate basis, would be 'a distinct
step in the direction of nationalisation' and 'the disintegration of the insurance
principle'.'2 This led the societies to have doubts about the wisdom of'extension' too
for, as the Commission had warned, 'we feel sure that the wider the scope of these
services, the more difficult will it be to retain the insurance principle'.'3 And once the
insurance principle went, so would go the case against equal benefits for even the
leader of the offices (Sir Thomas Neill) had acknowledged the justice of the latter
once Exchequer finance took over."
To Henry Lesser, 'The whole thing savoured ofthe Poor Law'. Approved societies,
he argued, needed to keep National Health Insurance 'a separate entity' in order to
preserve their own lives: 'The twin pillars ofthat scheme were the approved societies
and the insurance committees. If they smashed one of those pillars, they could not
expect the other to support the superstructure.!" By the time the Government came
to draft the 1928 National Health Insurance Act, then, the societies had made their
position clear-they did not want 'unification' at any price.
Neville Chamberlain, then Minister of Health, swiftly accommodated them. This
surprised many, for the Ministry had come out strongly for unification before the
Royal Commission on National Health Insurance.' It was needed urgently in the
maternity services where the division between National Health Insurance, local
authorities and the Poor Law was thought to be partly responsible for the high
mortality rates then prevailing. Baldwin (then Prime Minister), it was true, had ruled
out any reforms that cost money but this, far from draining funds, was designed to
savethem.'7 To understand why the Conservatives changed their mind onthesubject,
we need to go back a few years.
* Since insurance committees were given control of medical benefit in 1911, they thought they
would administer any additional benefits in the form of treatment too-and on this they received
the strongest support from the doctors. The approved societies, however, decided otherwise, dis-
satisfied as they were with the administration ofmedical benefit, and the Ministry let them get away
with it. This led to a series ofangry clashes between 1921 (when additional benefits began) and 1926,
erupting most damagingly in the 1923 pay dispute and before the Royal Commission on National
Health Insurance. Medical influence on insurance committees, far greater than its 10 per cent pro-
portion would imply, helped committee clerks to override the protests of the 60 per cent society
majority.
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Even before the Commission sat, the Government planned to proceed with the
'unification' programme which had been dropped in 1920. Chamberlain, in fact, had
laid down a timetable ofreform which called for the abolition, first, ofthe guardians
(in 1926) and then ofinsurance committees (in 1927), thereby eliminating the overlap
from both sources and removing the 'taint' of the Poor Law from the Ministry.18
Among other factors, however, the resistance of the guardians upset the timetable
and the Government did not complete its plans to abolish them until 1928.19
The delay gave the approved societies the breathing-space they needed to save
insurance committees and they were aided not only by the Government's guilt over
the Economy Act but by the offices' considerable influence in the Conservative Party,
increased no doubtbythe elevation ofSir Kingsley Wood* to Parliamentary Secretary
ofthe Ministry ofHealth in November, 1924. Judging from the way the question was
allowed to recede quietly in the background ofthe 'pooling' dispute, the Government
probably called offits plans to abolish insurance committees early in 1927 but delayed
public announcement long enough to assure the end of the guardians.20 It was
possible, of course, to eliminate one without the other but the plans to kill both
had become linked in the 'extension' programme.21 Logically, 'unification' did not
depend on 'extension' but, with so many vested interests involved, the Government
realized that it would be difficult to force through the former without the latter. The
profession itselfhad forged the tie between the two concepts in 1923 when, in view of
the economic conditions then prevailing, it told the societies that the only hope of
'extension' lay through 'unification'.22 This was why the friendly societies assumed
that insurance committees would be saved after they rejected 'pooling', which no
doubt influenced their decision on the subject.23
Nevertheless, while they retained insurance committees, the Tories went ahead with
their plans to abolish the guardians, if only to forestall wider reform by a Labour
Government. For this reason also, the approved societies accepted the Local Govern-
ment Act of 1929. Notwithstanding its tendency toward 'a clean sweep of all public
health schemes into the hands of local authorities', for the moment at least the Act
meant 'a period of subsequent peace'.M
Local authority attitudes also influenced the Government's decision. Here there
was a sharp difference of opinion between medical officers ofhealth and other local
authority personnel. For medical officers of health the 1929 Act presented a great
opportunity: itpromised to accelerate the slowgrowth inwhole-time appointments**
and close the gap between curative and preventive medicine. Not only hospitals but
* Wood, a solicitor, represented the offices during the negotiations on the 1911 Bill and hisfirm-
Wood, Williams and Murphy-continued to act for them throughout the entire National Health
Insurance period. Wood was active on the London County Council and London Insurance Com-
mittee from 1911-2 but he did not win national attention until 1917 when he drew up a scheme for a
Ministry-of Health on behalf of the approved societies. In 1919, he entered Parliament and stayed
there until his death in 1943 when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. He held all three political
postsatthe MinistryofHealth: ParliamentaryPrivateSecretary toDr.(laterLord)Addison, 1919-22;
Parliamentary Secretary to Neville Chamberlain, 1924-9; and Minister in his own right, 1935-8.
** There was a sharp increase in the number of whole-time appointments following the 1909
Housing and Town Planning Act. But, between then and 1928, there was hardly any increase at all,
the total hovering around 350 out of 1,233. This was only abouta29 per cent proportion-compared
with 25 per cent (out ofamuch smaller totalnumber) in1873.Brit. med. J., 1928,U9575-6(Robinson).
Lancet, 1928,1, 875. For a full list showing which authorities employedwhole-tine, and which part-
time, medical oflicers ofhealth in 1929, see Nursing Notes, 1929, pp. 20-1.
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now, forthe first time, domiciliary care was within their grasp. Due to British Medical
Association action, the latter had been barred under the Public Health Acts from
1918* but the transfer of the Poor Law brought domiciliary care for paupers under
theircontrol andtheywanted toextendcoveragetoinsuredpersons. Thehighmaternal
mortality rates, above all else, was what spurred them. They wanted to remove cash
payments from the grasp of greedy industrial insurance agents.25
As in 1911 and 1919, however, clerks and councillors felt differently. Already over-
burdened with preparation for the Poor Law, they had no wish to take on more,
particularly in an area where they had no experience and which would involve them
in delicate disputes with doctors.** Furthermore, they were afraid of being made to
meet the costs of administration.26
DOCTORS CHANGE THEIR MINDS ON UNIFICATION
In terms of future development, however, the most relevant-and revealing-part
of the whole story was the transformation of medical attitudes. To the astonishment
ofeveryone, the doctors stifled their cry for 'unification' at the critical moment. They
had welcomed the abolition of the guardians in the hope not only of stopping the
movement, long underway, toward a whole-time Poor Law service but also ofremov-
ing the danger, in a few areas, of approved society influence on the guardians.27
With the co-operation of sympathetic medical officers of health, like Dr. (later Sir
John) Charles of Newcastle (who, in 1950, became Chief Medical Officer of the
Ministry ofHealth), they did, in fact, manage to introduce the principle offree choice
into the Poor Law.t But not all medical officers of health agreed with British
Medical Association policy and the profession feared the creation ofa salaried service
ifitpushed ahead with 'unification' too far and too fast. The Government, it was true,
assured the doctors of its opposition to such a system28 but there was always the
chance that Labour might return to power-and British MedicalAssociation influence
in the Labour movement (earlier, quite strong) was, at this moment, on the wane.
Furthermore, as Ministry spokesmen proclaimed before the Commission, circum-
stances might force any Government (local or national) to adopt it. Mr. (later Sir
Laurence) Brock, Assistant Secretary of the Ministry, believed this might happen
merely ifdependants were added to the panel: ' . . . the whole basis of payment and
method oforganization ofthat service would be required to be reviewed, and although
I am not expressing any opinion in favour of a salaried service, at any rate it would
be a matterfor serious consideration as to whether the demand might not be met more
* Both the Acts passed in 1918 (Education as well as Maternity and Child Welfare) contained
bans against a general domiciliary service for mothers and children. But, it is important to note,
the 1919 Statute creating the Ministry of Health left the Minister free to introduce a salaried service
by Regulation-and this power remained in the Act throughout the entire National Health Insurance
period.
** Onlythe LondonCountyCouncil waswilling to take on thejob-not the other authorities. I am
indebted to Sir Allen Daley (the former Medical Officer of Health of the London County Council)
for calling the opposition of the authorities to my attention. Letter to writer, 31 January 1962.
t This was proposed by the British Medical Association as early as 1839 and recommended by
the Majority on the Poor Law Commission in 1905 but it was not implemented anywhere until 1927.
Even then, it did not make much progress until Dr. Charles took it up in 1933. Brit. med. J., 1926,
ii, 377-8 (Martin); 1929, ii, supp., 221-3 (Snell); 1933, i, supp., 172-3 (para. 105), 249-50; 1934, i,
386; 1934, i, supp., 1-2, 9-10; 1935, i, supp., 125-6 (Charles), 139.
Lancet, 1936, i, 1439-40; 1937, 1, 167-8.
115Frank Honigsbaum
economically by the provision ofa salaried service.'29 The same, said another Ministry
spokesman, might happen with the addition ofinstitutional services, since Poor Law,
as well as tuberculosis and maternity experience, suggested the need for 'close co-
ordination between the institutional and domiciliary staffs, and it is doubtful whether
co-ordination could be secured ifthe scheme in view is to cover both and a free choice
of doctor is to be maintained.'30
The doctors also felt uneasy simply about being brought into close relationship
with local authorities and medical officers of health. Here, however, opinion was
divided and ambivalent, concerned above all with the role played by medical officers
of health. Should they be whole-time or part-time? The British Medical Association
had long stood for the whole-time principle and the Royal Commission on Local
Government came out for the same policy.31 But Brackenbury, from his long ex-
perience in local government, had come to see the contradiction between this and the
British Medical Association's demand for part-time general practitioners to stafflocal
authority clinics.82 Whole-timers preferred to work with whole-timers-yet the
British Medical Association had to extend the part-time principle if only to enable
general practitioners to serve on local authorities. With 'unification' imminent, this
question assumed great importance. How else could the profession secure the same
representation on local authorities as it enjoyed on insurance committees? At the
moment, it was true, part-timers were also barred from office but the Royal Com-
mission on Local Government promised to remove the ban.* The whole-time medical
officer ofhealth who refused to employ part-time general practitioners then, was the
major obstacle in the way. Brackenbury saw that the British Medical Association
would have to reverse its policy on the subject, particularly after its rival, the Medical
Practitioners' Union,** came out openly for part-timers.s3
How, however, could it do so without antagonizing whole-time medical officers of
health and their Society? There was no question of displacing those who already
enjoyed whole-time status. In any event, since they were found in populous areas,
they rarely came in contact with general practitioners. The problem centred, rather,
on the smaller authorities-boroughs and urban district councils-within the county
council areas. There the part-timer still reigned and Brackenbury wanted to preserve
his place. He did this in a subtle manner-by defending the right of the smaller
authorities to actwithoutcountycouncil control astheydidinthefield ofeducation.X4
As long as they operated autonomously, they would find it uneconomical to make
whole-time appointments. But even if that strategy failed, he was willing to risk
'unification' if only to stop further encroachment from local authority clinics on
general practitioner work. He had come out strongly for dependent coverage under
National Health Insurance" but, since that had been ruled out on grounds ofcost,
* The ban was eventually relaxed in the 1933 Local Government Act but not as much as the
British Medical Association hoped. It applied only to doctors serving part-time inclinics, not district
medical officers under the Poor Law even where freechoice had been won. By 1936, only 150 doctors
had been elected to 120 authorities and not all, by any means, followed British Medical Association
policy.Ent. med. J., 1936, U, supp., 258-9; 1942,1, supp., 53, 81-3.
** Despite its much smaller membership (2-3,000 compared to 30,000), the Medical Practitioners'
UnionwasathomintheBritish MedicalAssociation's sidethroughout theNationalHealthInsurance
period. It spoke, by and large, for the more militant panel general practitioner -one who had little
private practice-and repeatedly accused British Medical Association leaders of 'selling out' to the
Ministry, thereby forcing them to adopt more extreme positions than they considered desirable.
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who knew where the new powers added by the Poor Law would lead medical officers
of health? The only way general practitioners could protect themselves, he argued,
was within a unified service-by offsetting the influence of medical officers of health
on local authority policy.
Dr. (later Sir Guy) Dain,* however, was unwilling to take the gamble-and he had
a large following in British Medical Association circles. The profession knew where
it stood, he argued, with insurance committees but not with local authorities: 'There
was a tremendous disinclination on the part of the general practitioner to being in
the employment of the medical officer of health and of the health committees as at
present constituted.'36 The Medical Practitioners' Union shifted uneasily back and
forth between these points ofview. On the one hand, it saw 'unification' as a way for
general practitioners to secure access to Poor Law hospitals-and it also thought it
could negotiate higher rates for specialist care (ifever added to the panel) from local
authorities than from a society-influenced administration.37 On the other hand, it
feared the political bias of many councillors and shared Dain's doubts about the
advantage of complete 'unification'. In the end, it came down on the side of 'co-
ordination' rather than 'unification', calling for the end of only approved societies,
not insurance committees.ss
Chamberlain's Local Government Act did much to confirm Dain's fears. In con-
trast to National Health Insurance, the statute was inspired by the doctrine of local
control. Largely because of their rate-making power, local authorities had always
enjoyed more freedom than insurance committees. As far as public health was con-
cerned, the only real departmental lever over their work had come in the form of
percentage grants designed to stimulate the development of specific services like
maternity and child welfare. Most amounted to 50 per cent, but, for venereal disease,
they ran as high as 75 per cent. Newman attached the highest value to this device
but Chamberlain did not. Like the Geddes Committee (which wanted to cut the rates
to 5 per cent in 1922), he felt the Ministry had inherited a burden of indiscriminate
grant-giving left by the Local Government Board (when it was absorbed in 1919).**
In the 1929 Act, therefore, he reversed the whole tendency toward central control by
substituting block grants (fixed for five-year periods) which left local authorities
considerable discretion as to how the money would be spent. The only safeguard he
inserted was the power to reduce the grant if, upon investigation, the Ministry found
services to be inefficient."" Since the British Medical Association had always been
stronger at the centre than the periphery, this change threatened to undermine its
influence in a unified service. Insurance committee subservience to the Department
was much more compatible withthe pattern ofBritish Medical Association power'0-
as well as with the profession's desire to be free from supervisory control: ' . . . the
local representatives are too much in our midst, and we shall be worried by their
day-to-day interference'.41
* Dain, a Birmingham general practitioner, was Brackenbury's main rival for the leadership of
the British Medical Association between the wars. Hequalified in 1893 but did notplay an active role
inBritish MedicalAssociation politicsuntiltheWar.OnseveraloccasionshechallengedBrackenbury's
policy with success (as in this instance) but never displaced him from leadership. After Brackenbury
died in 1942, Dain emerged as the chiefnegotiator over the Health Service, remaining active in the
British Medical Association almost until his death in 1966.
** The main abuse, it was thought, came on welfare milk schemes. Lancet, 1922, i, 383.
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The same philosophy inspired Chamberlain's reform of the Poor Law. While the
guardians were abolished, local authorities were given enough discretion to continue
the Poor Law virtually intact. It was true that they were directed to remove as many
functions from the Poor Law as possible but no specific provision was made to see
that this was carried out. Instead, the authorities were merely instructed to form
public assistance committees to which all Poor Law duties were assigned en bloc.
It was then possible for another transfer to take place-to one of the functional
committees of the council (like the public health committee) which would, in effect,
remove the service from the Poor Law. But this move could all too easily be blocked
by the opposition of public assistance committees. In the case of the hospitals, the
transfer did not have to be total; some could be taken out of the Poor Law while
the others were left. But no such choice was permitted with the district medical
service. It had to remain under the Poor Law and only the protests of the British
Medical Association forced the Ministry to shift supervisory control from a lay
official to the medical officer ofhealth.'2
This right of local option ruled out any statutory protection for the profession,
either in the form oflocal medical committees or representation on the public health
committee. Had all the medical services ofthe Poor Law been transferred to the latter
in one swoop, then Parliament might have granted the British Medical Association's
demands. But before that could have happened, it would have been necessary to
decide the form the domiciliary service should take. Would all local authorities be
willing to continue the panel system-or would they opt for the salaried medical
service under the Poor Law in some areas? The British Medical Association thought
it safer not to raise the question atthe time. It already had protection, under the 1918
legislation, against a salaried service outside the Poor Law (and this was continued
in the 1929 Act). Was it not wiser to leave the district medical services intact and
then fight the issue out area by area? Paradoxically then, the British Medical
Association was partly responsible for the rejection of its own demands.
ThankstoLord Dawson,* theActwasamended so as togivethevoluntaryhospitals
(though notnecessarily theprofession) theright ofconsultation overhospital adminis-
tration-but this did not apply to other medical services, whether under the Poor
Law or not.43 Furthermore, despite its support for co-option before the Royal
Commission on National Health Insurance," the Ministry refused to compel it on
either public assistance or public health committees. As on all the committees of the
council (except finance), as many as one-third of the members could be co-opted if
theauthoritydesiredbutno orderswereissued onthesubject. Instead,theDepartment
decided merely to give advice. Even then, it did not single out doctors for co-option,
urging public assistance committees to enlist the aid only of persons with Poor Law
experience. As far as public health committees were concerned, a British Medical
Association survey showed that 'a very large number' made no provision at all for
co-option, not even Brackenbury's own Middlesex County Council. Doctors in the
* Bertrand Dawson was a prominent physician who played a leading role in medical politics from
1917 until his death in 1945, both in the British Medical Association and in the Royal College of
Physicians. He was the Chairman of the Ministry Committee that produced the famous Dawson
Report in 1920 in which the idea of health centres first received official sanction. For an account of
his life, see Francis Watson, Dawson ofPenn, London, Chatto & Windus, 1950.
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employ of the authorities, whether part-time or whole-time, were still barred from
office, the Act going so far as to threaten the displacement of some doctors already
elected. As Brackenbury complained, medical men did not enjoy the same rights as
teachers. The latter, in some areas, had been given representation on education
committees but this did not apply to doctors and public health committees.4"
The profession here ran up against the same Local Government Board tradition
which plagued the approved societies earlier on local authority pension, maternity
and tuberculosis committees. The words ofSir Alfred Mond (later Lord Melchett) in
1921 (rejecting an attempt to compel the co-option ofinsurance committee members
to tuberculosis committees upon the transfer of sanatorium benefit) returned now to
haunt the doctors: 'I cannot see my way, and I do not think anyone standing in my
position could see his way, to force a local authority which is elected by the ratepayers
to conduct a certain service, to co-opt members on a committee which is dealing with
such a service, whether they want them there or not.'46 In any case, he asserted,
experts should not be given executive authority-and here he was only echoing one
of the unwritten rules of British government. Labour, too, had opposed co-option-
but for a different reason: it wanted to keep the reactionary guardians out of Poor
Law administration. But the effect of the Conservatives' policy was to turn public
assistance committees into little more than boards of guardians with a new name.47
In addition, the Act failed to preserve the independence of boroughs and urban
district councils as Brackenbury hoped. Here he was running counter to progressive
thought. Some county councils, it was true, left much to be desired and the power
which the block grant gave them needed to be watched. Not all the smaller
authorities, furthermore, were impotent. Dr. L. J. Picton had demonstrated what
good an urban district council could do both for the public and the profession. As
panel doctor and part-time medical officer of health at Winsford, he persuaded the
Council not to establish ante-natal clinics but to let general practitioners do the work
in their own surgeries. The experiment worked so well that it was later extended to
the county (Cheshire) as awhole.'8 This was the policy the British MedicalAssociation
wanted the nation to follow and no doubt the course of public health history in
Britain would have been different had it succeeded. But not all part-time medical
officers ofhealth were as energetic as Picton and too many smaller sanitary authorities
had neglected to exercise the duties placed on them. They badly needed the spurwhich
only a full-time medical officer of health could give. The Act, therefore, subjected
them to the supervision ofcounty councils which, in turn, were directed to introduce
the whole-time principle through the medium ofjoint employment schemes.* This
led to the growth** ofthe whole-time public health corps in the 1930s which, despite
Brackenbury's heroic efforts at conciliation, drove the profession further apart and
set the stage for the rejection ofhealth centres, salary and control by medical officers
of health in the 1940s.
* These schemes, which started in 1912, called for the combination of districts or appointments
(i.e. assistant county medical officer ofhealth and district medical officer ofhealth). Medical officers
ofhealth preferred the first method; the Ministry, the second. Public Health, July, 1928, pp. 299-300;
March, 1931, pp. 161-2.
** The growth, however, was not as rapid as expected. As late as 1938, maany county councils
had still not appointed whole-timers for districts as the Act directed. Medical Ofcr, 1938, 1, 2.
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Even with the rejection of their other demands, the doctors might have been
willing to gamble on 'unification' in 1929 if local medical committees had found a
place in the Act. They felt they could live without direct representation on local
authorities but notwithout thestatutorybodiestheyfoughtsohardfor in 1911.49Once
local medical committees went, the doctors lost their enthusiasm for 'unification' and,
in so doing, they revealed the extent to which their attitude had changed since 1923.
Their 'glorious victory' in the decisive pay dispute ofthat year had wrought a revolu-
tioninapproved society/medical relationswhichtheprofessionwasonlyjustbeginning
to perceive. Approved society power was waning fast. At that moment, in fact, a
solution to the profession's long-standing grievances on the disciplinary procedure
was in sight. The doctors thus had less to fear from insurance committees than from
local authorities.
Bythe 1940s, thishad become clearevento themostunpolitical generalpractitioner.
Approved societies, thanks to the Beveridge Report and the 1945 Labour Govern-
ment, disappeared for ever from social insurance as well as from insurance com-
mittees. Their places on the latter-now called executive councils-were taken by
the 'neutrals' of the past, the public (local authority and Ministry) appointees. In
addition their number was cut from an overwhelming (60 per cent for approved
societies, 90 per cent for all lay persons) to a bare lay majority as on medical service
sub-committees. Executive councils, in fact, became little more than 'lay fronts' for
local medical committees. Was it any wonder that, in 1942-4,the doctors rejected any
thought oflocal authority control?
Now, twenty-five years later, the situation is different. General practitioners no
longer fear clinics and they have forgotten the clashes of the past. Some distrust still
lingers, but the two branches of the profession are being driven together by man-
power shortages and the demands ofcommunity medicine. General practitioners can
no longer dowithout the aid that only medical officers ofhealth can offer, particularly
in the form of district nurses, midwives, health visitors and home helps. The time is
ripe for integration, ifnot unification, between two branches ofthe Service and other
pressures-notably the need for shorter bed stays-are pushing hospitals in the
same direction. Complete structural integration will take time to realize, depending
above all on the creation of larger regional forms of government. But the history of
the attempt made in 1926-9 offers some guide as to the kind ofsecurity the profession
needs before it will risk abandoning what it has now.
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